Troop increase

Francesc Vendrell, a Spanish diplomat, was EU Special Representative for Afghanistan from 2002 to 2008 and the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative for Afghanistan from 2000 to 2001. In the academic year 2008/2009 he was a visiting professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Deutsche Welle: US President Barack Obama will soon decide on the new strategy for Afghanistan. What do you expect it to look like?

Francesc Vendrell: I would imagine from the few signals that one gets that there will be a decision to increase the number of US forces, probably not to the number of 40,000 but more in the middle range of 20,000 or something like that. I would like to hope that it is somehow made conditional on a 180-day program of reforms that the Afghan government ought to undertake and that if this reforms happen or are seen to be taking place that then the United States would send more forces. But sending more forces without a government that has legitimacy and the capacity to deliver isn't going to make much of a difference.

There is a lot of talk that once the Obama administration makes this decision that they will of course also come to Europe and ask for the Europeans to play their part. What could Europe and Germany as the third biggest troop contributor do in Afghanistan?

That's a very difficult question to answer. To the extent that the discussion over the last three months has centered a lot around increasing the number of military forces, I think Europeans feel a little bit left out, because obviously we are not going to match anything near the number of forces that the US is talking about. What would have been desirable, but again difficult to implement would have been for example if the Europeans were able to say look, we are going to take care of training the police and this is going to be our task. So we will coordinate with you, the US about your efforts to build up the national army, but leave the police to us.

Unfortunately, it's too late. And we are not willing either or capable of coming up with the required numbers. So at the end of the day, I think what will happen is that we will play an auxiliary policy to the Americans. And yes, I think on issues like human rights, women's rights and maybe some rule of law aspects I think we can do much more and we will probably do more.

This secondary role will only grow because the US will send a lot more troops while the Europeans will probably only slightly increase their numbers, so it will look even more like an American mission. Does that make it not again much harder to convince the European publics of those efforts?

I think what needs to be done is, that the newly elected President Karzai needs to carry out major reforms in 180 days in order to awaken the Afghan public to the fact that things are now going to change. This will also help with our own public opinion. If our publics begin to read that now there is progress in fighting corruption, that some of the more notorious figures have been thrown out of the government, that there are some prosecutions, I think you will see a greater willingness by the European countries and the European public to accept that yes, we may have to accept losses in the course of that.

But if the perception is that we are losing people fighting against the Taliban and in a way for the sake of a government that is corrupt and incompetent then of course it isn't going to happen.

Read more about the expectations for Afghanistan

From your long experience in Afghanistan, can President Karzai be trusted and can he make the changes that are required now?

President Karzai was I think the best person in 2001 to lead the interim administration. I don't think that either the Americans or the Europeans supported him enough in the first few years. We allowed the commanders and the war lords to remain in power. They were the ones who brought about corruption and bad government and President Karzai was virtually unable to do anything about it.

So I think what's really happened over the past three years is that the President has given up and has decided that if he wanted to continue to stay in power, he better have dealings with these various nasty figures whom we foreigners seem to be willing to coopt. He just has lacked the means to do it and enough pressure and support to do so.

There is of course now talk about an exit strategy in a few years, especially if clear progress hasn't been achieved by then. And according to public sentiment the Afghan mission already is pretty much doomed. If you try to look two years ahead how could Afghanistan look in your estimation?

That very much depends on how we are able to influence and help President Karzai to carry out the reforms we want. It certainly will not happen if on the one side we ask President Karzai for example to get rid of his brother in Kandahar and at the same time the CIA continues to subsidize him.

There has to be a serious approach to the issue and we also need to tell Karzai that there is a lot criticism about him having General Dostum as an ally. But remember over a year and a half ago he was trying to get rid of him and the ISAF and the military forces said if you get rid of him fine, but you are on your own, we are not going to intervene, if he creates a problem. No wonder that he eventually ended up doing a deal with General Dostum.

There is a lot of talk and expectations are already building over the upcoming Afghanistan conference to be held early next year. Can this conference bring about real change?

To be honest, an international conference, unless it is very carefully prepared and its results are already clear, is a usesless excercise. At best it is a band aid. There were some, like the one in Bonn, which are of course absolutely essential. But governments seemed to find it easier to spend money in an international conference, rather than ensuring that there are major changes on the ground.

If you could give advice as to a concrete step in Afghanistan to both the Americans and the Europeans what would you tell them?

I don't believe that the Afghans can't have or don't want a representative government. They do, they want a representative government, they've had a parliament in the 1960s, they have shuras and jirgas, so they are used to this. They also understand the minimal concepts of the rule of law and the judiciary and the police system. So we cannot fight the Taliban unless we also take care of these issues. And this is why it is so important to insist on changes and quick changes now, because we don't have all the time in the world to either persuade the Afghans that they should support the government and we don't have very much time to persuade our public opinion that we need to stay there.

The interview was conducted by Michael Knigge at the EU Washington Forum organised by the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Editor: Rob Mudge