A symbolic meeting

Japan's Premier Abe has been pushing for a summit with President Xi on the sidelines of an APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) gathering in Beijing next month. A one-on-one meeting would be of great significance as the leaders of the world's second and third-biggest economies have not met during their time in power. Moreover, ties between China and Japan have worsened in the past two years over regional rivalry and a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Questions have been raised, however, as to what Abe may have offered the Chinese to secure the meeting. The magazine The Diplomat quoted the Japan daily Mainichi as saying that Japan made a three-prong proposal to China in order to secure the meeting. According to the report, which cited "Japanese government sources," Japan proposed that during his meeting with Xi, Abe would first reassert that the disputed Islands are an inherent part of Japanese territory, but then "acknowledge that China has a case as well" to the islands.

He would then propose that China and Japan seek to settle the issue through mutual dialogue over time. None of this would be included in a joint statement or any other documents officially released after the summit meeting.

However, James D. J. Brown, a Japan expert at Temple University's campus in Tokyo, says in a DW interview that such a concession would represent a complete reversal of Japan's long-held position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Even if such assurances were only given in private, Tokyo would be risking provoking uproar amongst Japanese nationalists, says Brown.

DW: How important would a Xi-Abe meeting be for both China and Japan?

James D. J. Brown: Such a meeting would be extremely important symbolically. It is now approaching two years that President Xi and Prime Minister Abe have been in power and the fact that they have yet to meet is a serious concern. They are the leaders of the world's second- and third-largest economies and it is vital they establish a reliable channel of communication at the highest level. Even if the anticipated meeting extends little beyond a handshake, it will help to reduce regional tensions and reassure investors.

Are any breakthroughs to be expected from this meeting?

Despite the importance of the event, expectations should be kept in check. The only likely breakthrough will be the occurrence of the meeting itself. Due to Beijing's continuing suspicions of Prime Minister Abe, I would not anticipate the Chinese side agreeing to anything more substantive than a handshake and brief exchange of pleasantries. This will visibly demonstrate a reduction in bilateral tensions, yet will not require China to fully drop its previous opposition to the Japanese leader.

What has brought about this change in direction?

Both sides have evidently become alarmed by the extent to which relations have become inflamed and are therefore eager to reduce tensions. Most active in this regard has been Tokyo. With the policy of Abenomics stuttering, Japan would benefit greatly from the economic boost that improved ties with China would deliver. Convincing Beijing to agree to a one-to-one leaders' meeting would also be a personal victory for Prime Minister Abe.

China's more accommodating stance is also likely to be informed partly by economic considerations. Chinese economic growth has been slowing and this has not been helped by a near 50 percent fall in Japanese foreign direct investment in China during the first six months of 2014.

Perhaps an even more important consideration for Beijing, however, is the fact that the APEC Summit is an internationally prestigious event. As host in 2014, China will want to present itself as a responsible international stakeholder. In this context, refusing any meeting whatsoever with the Japanese leader would have appeared petty.

What are your views on reports by Japanese media stating that Japan would "acknowledge that China has a case as well" to the islands?

Despite being reported in the Japanese media, I find it very difficult to believe that Japan would "acknowledge that China has a case as well" and "propose settling the issue through mutual dialogue over time."

This would represent a complete reversal of Japan's long-held position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Even if such assurances were only given in private, Tokyo would be risking provoking uproar amongst Japanese nationalists. There would also be widespread concern that such concessions would be interpreted as weakness and would only encourage Chinese assertiveness.

I have no doubt that the Japanese government has indeed made assurances to Beijing in advance of the APEC Summit, but these are likely to have been limited. As well as pledging to reduce tensions over the territorial dispute, it is probable that a promise has been made that Prime Minister Abe will not return to the controversial Yasukuni shrine in the near future.

These assurances should be enough to secure the cherished photo opportunity with President Xi, but will not be sufficient to lead to a fundamental transformation in the relationship.

What impact has the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands had on bilateral ties?

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute returned to global prominence in September 2012 when the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from their private owners. This provoked a major backlash from China, leading to the outbreak of anti-Japanese riots and Beijing's freezing of high-level political ties.

The intensification of the dispute has had negative economic implications for each side, but the primary concern is security. With Japanese and Chinese ships increasingly active in the disputed area, there has been a very real risk of armed clashes. In the most pessimistic scenario, such exchanges could escalate into a wider conflict between China and Japan.

With Prime Minister Abe himself having noted the parallels between East Asia in 2014 and Europe a century earlier, there are even those who fear that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands could provide the spark for a much broader conflagration in much the same way as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand did in 1914.

James D. J. Brown is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus.